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ARTICLES
RETHINKING RIGHTS IN BIOSPACE
ROBIN FELDMAN*

ABSTRACT

Twenty-five years ago, federal courts opened the door to the
biotechnology revolution by granting patents on genetic inventions. Since
that time, decisions across five disparate doctrines reflect confusion over
the question of whether the definition of a biotechnology invention should
include things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.
Reaching beyond the state of the art may make sense for mechanical
inventions, but it is wreaking havoc in doctrines relatedto biotechnology.
This Article argues that in uncertain arts such as biotechnology, the
definition of an invention should be limited to the state of the art at the time
of the invention. Granting rights beyond knowledge at the time of the
invention projects an enormous shadow across the future and creates
untenable results. The temptation to restrainthat reach has led to strange
doctrinal twists and an unworkable body of law. After twenty-five years of
experience, it is time to rethink our view of the proper shape of rights in
this realm.
* Associate Professor; Director, Law & Bioscience Project, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court opened the door to the
biotechnology revolution by granting inventors the right to hold patents on
genetically engineered organisms. In the seminal case of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Court ruled that inventors can patent an organism itself,
not just the process of creating it.' Although the outcome was
revolutionary, the resulting legal doctrines were familiar. The case and its
progeny would treat biologic inventions, such as genetically engineered
organisms and laboratory crafted genes, the way patent law treats
mechanical products, such as dishwashers and doorknobs.
Chakrabarty helped pave the way for the explosion in the
biotechnology industry. The nature of such inventions, however,
increasingly conflicts with rules crafted for mechanical products. In
particular, decisions across five disparate doctrines reflect confusion over
the question of whether the definition of a biotechnology invention should
include things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.
In patent law, we define a product by identifying its structure. Once
the structure is identified, the inventor then controls the product, no matter
what materials are used to make it, or what method is used to construct it.
For example, suppose our simple mechanical invention is a doorknob.
Once the patent holder identifies the "doorknob" invention by describing
the structure of a doorknob, the patent holder controls all doorknobs. This
is true regardless of whether the other doorknobs are made of wood, glass,
or plastic. The rule is intended to protect inventors from those who would
make minor alterations and claim "a new product."
While the rule may make sense in the context of simple mechanical
inventions, it wreaks havoc in the realm of biotechnology. For example,
suppose the invention is not a doorknob, but an antibody. The inventor
begins by isolating and identifying a harmful agent, perhaps something that
causes cancer in humans. Next, the inventor isolates and identifies a single
antibody that binds with the harmful agent. Based on identifying the single
antibody, the inventor then claims the right to all antibodies that bind with
the harmful agent. In simplified terms, the inventor wishes to claim the
class of things created by the immune system that bind with the relevant
agent. Analogous to claiming the class of doorknobs, the inventor claims
I. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (interpreting § 101 of the Patent Act, which
lists patentable subject matter).
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the class of relevant antibodies, no matter what materials are used to make
the antibodies or how they are constructed.
We know much more about doorknobs, however, than we do about
antibodies. For example, we know much more about the materials that can
be used to construct doorknobs than we do about the materials that can be
used to construct antibodies.
Suppose that at the time of the antibody invention described above,
antibodies were made in the lab using DNA-encoding materials from mice.
At that time, no one in the field of science knew how to do much beyond
that. Suppose that a later inventor constructs the relevant antibody using
DNA-encoding materials from a combination of different species, perhaps
one section from human materials and another section from mouse
materials. Or better yet, suppose an inventor creates an appropriate
antibody using materials almost entirely from the human body, so that the
antibody could be administered to human patients without the risk of
rejection. Suppose further that development of a humanized antibody that
binds to a specific antigen would be quite difficult to accomplish, and
humanized antibodies were entirely unknown when the mouse-based
antibody was created. Should we nevertheless grant the inventor of the
relevant mouse antibody control of all relevant humanized ones?
A doorknob is a doorknob, regardless of whether it is made of wood
or glass. Can we really say, however, that an antibody is an antibody, no
matter how it works or what materials it is made out of? Moreover, are we
prepared to say that an antibody is an antibody at a time when our
knowledge of why particular antibodies arise in the body and how they fit
into the body's overall organic processes is limited?
This issue goes to the heart of the definition of an invention. Each
invention must be defined in a way that appropriately captures the nature of
the advancement as distinct from prior and future creations. One can think
of this as the footprint of the invention-in other words, how far an
inventor can reach against inventions that existed before and how far an
inventor can reach against those that will come after.
Modern case law reflects confusion over whether the footprint of an
invention includes things unknown at the time of the invention. Despite
precedent from cases related to mechanical inventions, courts have
increasingly shied away from permitting biotechnology inventors to reach
embodiments and characteristics unknown at the time of the invention.
They have done so, however, without a comprehensive vision of the
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problem or how to solve it. The result is a wealth of contradictory opinions
and unworkable doctrines.
For example, cases concerning how far a biotechnology inventor can
reach toward future inventions stand in contradiction to each other. Some
opinions conclude broadly that the definition of an invention includes all
embodiments, even those that could not have existed at the time of the
invention.2 Other opinions use claim construction doctrines to limit a patent
holder's reach only to embodiments known at the time of the invention. 3
Still others use a different set of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder's
reach sometimes includes things that were unknown at the time of the
invention, but not always. 4 These opinions, pulling in different directions,
make it difficult to predict how far an inventor can reach toward later
inventions.
Similar confusion exists in the doctrines related to how far an inventor
can reach toward earlier inventions. In general, a new invention cannot be
defined to include someone else's prior invention, or "prior art." 5 Some
opinions find that prior art includes things that were inherent in a prior
invention, but that no one knew about. 6 Other courts decline to read prior
art in that manner. 7 Still other courts answer the question of how far an
inventor can reach toward prior inventions by referencing doctrines
concerning how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions. 8 As
described above, doctrines related to defining earlier inventions are
remarkably confused about whether an invention includes things unknown
at the time of the invention. Most importantly, the convergence of these
areas demonstrates the futility of addressing piecemeal the question of
whether the definition of an invention includes things unknown at the time
of the invention.
One could argue that we should live with the inconsistencies. In fact,
some scholars suggest that we define an invention one way for one set of
doctrines and another way for another set of doctrines. 9 Such an approach,
2. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. See infra Part H1I.A.2.
4. See infra Part II.A.3.
5.
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting that "Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available").
6. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
infra Part llI.B.
7. See infra note 191 and accompanying text; infra Part IH.B.
8. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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however, inevitably leads to the type of chaos we are now experiencing.
How can we hold up a sphere and say, "When we look at it from one
direction it is an apple, and when we look at it from another direction it is
an orange"? We must establish a clear and comprehensive vision of how to
define an invention. Without this, we cannot hope to create a workable
body of law.
This Article argues that in uncertain arts such as biotechnology, the
definition of an invention should be limited to the state of the art at the time
of the invention. Biospace inventions ° are not like mechanical products.
Rather, they are elements in a complex biological interaction, one which
we understand only glimpses of at best. " In light of this, we cannot simply
define their structure and then grant rights to all embodiments of that
structure and everything inherent therein.
Granting rights beyond the state of knowledge at the time of the
invention can project an enormous shadow of rights across the future and
lead to untenable results. The temptation to restrain that reach is leading to
strange doctrinal twists and an unworkable body of law. After twenty-five
years of experience, it is time to rethink our view of the proper shape of
rights in this realm.
II. THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE IN BIOSPACE INVENTIONS
A. PATENTING LIVING ORGANISMS

In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application
for a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple
components of crude oil. 12 Although bacteria found in nature could degrade
individual components of oil, no natural bacteria could degrade a
combination of oil components. This made13 Chakrabarty's invention
particularly promising for cleaning up oil spills.
10. See infra text accompanying note 22.
11.
For example, Anne Magurran has noted that "[g]enes do not act singly, but in complex
networks intermeshing biochemical pathways that form a tangled web of development." Anne E.
Magurran, It's Not All in the Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, § 7, at 22, available at 2004 WLNR
5499896 (citing Henry Gee's discussion of the German school of naturphilosophieand its relevance for
modem genetic theories).
12.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
13.
Id.; John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of
Nature Doctrine as a Barrierto Biotechnology Patents (Part11), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
371, 371-72 (2003).
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Chakrabarty's application included claims related to the process for
manufacturing the organism, claims which were approved without much
consternation. 14 The more difficult claims concerned rights to the living
organism itself.
The patent examiner rejected Chakrabarty's claims related to the
organism itself on grounds including that living things are not patentable
subject matter because they are nature's creation rather than man's.5 The
case reached the Supreme Court on
the question of whether living things
6
may be patentable subject matter.'
17
Patentable subject matter is governed by § 101 of the Patent Act.
The section states that "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent .... " 8 The Supreme
Court, noting the expansive language of this section, concluded that
Congress intended to provide a wide scope for patentable subject matter,
one that would include the types of laboratory-created matter claimed by
Chakrabarty. 1 9 As the Court explained, "Congress thus recognized that the
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human
ingenuity and research. 2 °

After Chakrabarty,it was clear that laboratory-created inventions with
characteristics markedly different from nature are patentable subject matter,
assuming, of course, that the inventor could identify the potential for
significant utility. 2 1 The decision, therefore, announced clearly that
14. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305-06.
15. Id. at 306.
16. See id. at 307.
17. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
18. Id.
19. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (describing expansiveness of the terms); id. at 306
(describing the inventions as "laboratory-created micro-organisms").
20. See id. at 313.
21. See id. at 310. Some commentators argue that the biotechnology revolution would have
moved forward unimpeded without Chakrabarty. Inventors would have relied on patents for the process
of creating the thing, rather than obtaining a patent on the thing itself, or inventors would have protected
the invention as a trade secret. See LISA YOUNT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 66

(2000) (citing patent attorney Mitchel Zoler's belief that the decision was "trivial law" and patent
attorney Donald Dunner's estimation that the ruling was not life or death for the industry). Others argue
that the decision broke no new legal ground but provided only a minor clarification of existing law.
Nevertheless, the decision provided a tremendous boost to the biotechnology industry. Id. Following the
ruling, the Patent and Technology Office felt free to rule on the dozens of applications pending on
genetically engineered organisms. In addition, publicity from the decision stimulated investment in the
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inventors could protect the organism itself, not just the process of creating
it.
To create his invention, Chakrabarty used a process that can be
classified as genetic engineering, but did not involve recombinant DNA. 2 2
Many modern biologic inventions are invented using recombinant DNA.
Others are created as a result of techniques that involve recombinant
materials or bioengineering. To avoid the technicalities of what constitutes
biotechnology or one type of biologic invention as opposed to another, I
have chosen the term biospace. One can think of biospace as the
commercial space that includes things such as biotech creations and
inventions produced as a result of techniques that involve bioengineering or
biotechnology.
B. FROM PATENTING WHOLE ORGANISMS TO PATENTING THE
COMPONENTS OF LIFE

In a 1987 ruling, the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") extended
the doctrine announced in Chakrabarty to grant rights in more complex
organisms such as oysters. 23 The PTO, however, carefully excluded the
possibility of rights in human beings. 24 Despite this limitation, the ruling
also extended patent protection to components of life, such as genes, cells,
and organs, including components of human life.2 5
To grant patent rights for various components of life, the courts and
the PTO have relied on a combination of two types of authorities. The logic
begins with the notion from Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter
includes things found in nature as long as the inventor changes the product
industry. See id.; Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 185-86 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
22. See YOUNT, supra note 21, at 62. Some legal scholars describe Chakrabarty's invention as a
recombinant process, but Lisa Yount explains that Chakrabarty's invention should not be considered
recombinant because the individual plasmids were unaltered. Compare Conley & Makowski, supra
note 13, at 372 (describing Chakrabarty's invention as accomplished by recombinant DNA methods)
with YOUNT, supra note 21, at 62 (characterizing Chakrabarty's accomplishment as utilizing
recombinant DNA methods). For a description of recombinant DNA, see infra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
23. See Commissioner of Patentsand Trademarks, Policy Statement on Patentabilityof Animals,
1077 PAT. OFFICIAL GAZETTE 24 (1987), reprinted in 9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 24

app., at 24-2 (1999).
24. See id.
25. See id.
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to differ from the naturally occurring form. 26 In the case of components
such as human genes, authorities hold that the invention differs from the
naturally occurring form when the gene has been isolated and purified from
27
its natural setting.
The general rule that patents may be granted on things purified and
isolated from their natural state can be traced to a decision by Judge
Learned Hand in 19 11.28 In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K Mulford Co., Judge
Hand granted a patent on a substance purified from the adrenal glands of
cadavers. 29 The opinion reasoned that although the relevant substance
already existed in nature, the purified form could constitute a new product
because the purified form allowed a new and practical use. 30
The logical basis for patenting many biospace inventions rests on both
the Chakrabarty and the Parke-Davis lines of cases. In many recombinant
technologies, for example, genes are isolated from their natural state,
similar to the adrenaline in Parke-Davis, and then altered to behave
differently, similar to the genetically modified bacteria in Chakrabarty.
C.

THE ONE EMBODIMENT DOCTRINE

Custom and practice in the courts and the patent industry separate
patentable subject matter broadly into two types of patents: (1) products
and (2) processes. 3' The Patent Act itself does not employ such a neat,
bipolar categorization. Rather, the Act lists the categories of patentable
subject matter as processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of
26. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (citing
Chakrabarty as a basis for patenting genes); Michael John Gulliford, Comment, Much Ado About Gene
Patents: The Role of Forseeability,34 SETON HALL L. REv. 711,722 (2004).
27. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.
28. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912). See also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir.
1958).
29. Parke-Davis,189 F. at 103.
30. See id.
31.
See, e.g., Nestle-Le Mur Co. v. Eugene, Ltd., 55 F.2d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1932) (noting that
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are all products or articles and differ
fundamentally in nature from processes); Caterpillar Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1249,
1252 (N.D. Ind. 1996), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); I DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02 (2003) (separating patentable subject matter into products and
processes and noting that an applicant for a product patent is not required to specify whether it is for a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). Varying phrases may be used to refer to these
categories. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 922, (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(using the terms "apparatus" and "method"); John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible:
Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 225
(1998) (using the terms "artifact" and "processes or method").
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matter, and improvements thereof.3 2 Nevertheless, the two general
categories and the distinction between them have profound implications for
patent rights.
Traditionally, a product claim is defined in terms of structural
characteristics. 33 In other words, an inventor will claim rights to a
particular machine, which can be described by its structural design. To
qualify as patentable subject matter, however, the inventor must
demonstrate that the product has a use beyond mere academic curiosity. 34
Once the inventor identifies a single use for the product, the inventor may
exclude others from the full spectrum of the product, including any use of
the product and other embodiments of the product. 35 Thus, one
embodiment provides an inventor with a broad range of rights.
The same is not true for a process claim. 36 For example, if
Chakrabarty had received a patent on the process of making the
microorganism, he would have controlled only microorganisms made using
the process he had invented, not those made in any other way. By securing
product rights, however, Chakrabarty was protected by the "one
32.

See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

33.

See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.05 (2003).

34. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (describing patentable subject matter as "new and useful" inventions).
35. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d. 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946); Maurer v. Dickerson,
113 F. 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1902) (finding "that the claim is not restricted to the product made by the
described process, but covers the chemical individual, however produced"); Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001) (noting that "[a] patent on a composition gives
exclusive rights to the composition for a limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use");
Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The American Legal System's
Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 371, 392 (2002) (noting that the law
extends patent rights to unknown embodiments with unknown utilities when the inventor has disclosed
one embodiment with one utility); Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing ArtsBiotechnology, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 608, 611 (1988) (noting that a claim to a
composition of matter is not limited to the method of making or usage taught by the inventor). See also
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that it is not necessary
that a patent application test all embodiments of an invention); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (same); Continuous Curve Contact Lenses, Inc. v. Nat'l Patent Dev. Corp., No. CV 77802, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13879, at *113-14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1982) (noting it is well established
that product claims without process limitations cover the product, no matter how it is produced). But see
3 CHISUM, supra note 33, § 9.05 n.l (noting early cases with contrary results).
New uses may qualify for their own patents, in which case the parties hold patents that block
each other. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095. The use patents, however, would
be limited to that particular use or process and would not cover the full spectrum of uses of the product.
One who wished to engage in the new use would need permission from both the inventor holding the
original product patent and the inventor holding the new use patent.
36. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853); Winner, supra note 35, at 610-11 (noting
that unlike composition of matter claims, an inventor of one method of achieving a result cannot claim
all methods of achieving that result).
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embodiment" doctrine. He could control all manifestations of the
37
microorganism, no matter what process was used to produce it.
The one embodiment notion has different implications in the context
of mechanical inventions than in the context of biospace inventions. With a
machine, it is possible to define an invention by identifying its structure.
This is not to suggest that the inquiry is always easy or clear-cut, but at
least the terms of the inquiry are more easily defined by focusing on the
38
structure of the invention.
Thinking back to the doorknob, for example, the structural design is
what matters. It is what allows the thing to fit in the palm of your hand,
rotate easily, and integrate with and latch the door. Varying the materials or
the type of screwdriver used to make the doorknob is unlikely to make
much difference in terms of what the invention has contributed to society.
Furthermore, we know the elements that make up the doorknob, such as the
grip, the shaft that goes into the door, and the latch that goes into the
doorframe. There are no pieces we cannot explain or hints that the
doorknob might be integrating with the door in ways we never dreamed.
With biospace inventions, however, we grant rights in the face of
significant unknowns. While mechanical inventions are considered a
39
predictable art, biospace inventions are considered an unpredictable art.
For example, consider patent rights to genes isolated or manipulated in
ways distinguishable from genes undisturbed in the human body. Genes are
segments of the DNA double helix that exists inside cells from a living
37.

See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094-95 (noting that DNA claims

should be given the same scope as other composition of matter claims, such that one use brings a right
to all uses, even those unknown at the time of the patent).
38.
The machine analogy works reasonably well with chemical inventions. With chemicals, the
invention generally resides in the structural design of the new compound. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d
1552, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1995); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 92 (Stephen A. Merrill,
Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2005). Although there are exceptions, normally, the method of
making the compound is obvious once the structural design is determined. Moreover, the question of
whether the compound is sufficiently inventive over prior compounds rests frequently on a comparison
of the structural similarity between compounds. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in
Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 835-36 (1999).
39.
See Jeffie A. Kopczynski, Note, A New Erafor § 112? Exploring Recent Developments in the
Written Description Requirement as Applied to Biotechnology Inventions, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229,
238 (2002) (explaining that predictable arts, like the mechanical field, are those in which modifications
to a system will have recognized and predictable effects, and unpredictable arts are those in which there
is insufficient leaming to explain the effect that changed variables will have within a system). See also
Sheila R. Arriola, Comment, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the Heightened
Enablement and Written Description Requirements, II FED. CIR. B.J. 919, 932 (2002) (noting that
biotechnology has been branded an unpredictable art).
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creature. 40 Genes are made up of nucleotide building blocks. 4 1 These
building blocks not only form the structure of the gene, they also serve as
blueprints, providing the information necessary for the cell
to conduct
42
activities such as reproducing itself and constructing proteins.
Although the sequence of the nucleotide building blocks forms the
structure of the gene, there is nothing new about this structure. It already
exists in nature and is not a new design of human ingenuity. 43 The problem
for human ingenuity lies in identifying which sequences might be useful,
achieving the technical hurdle of separating the sequence out from its
natural form and recombining it in a more useful form, and finally,
44
determining what to do with what that form.
In many genetic experiments that lead to patents, scientists begin by
identifying and separating out the DNA sequence that carries the coding
information needed. For example, scientists might be trying to create large
amounts of a particular protein that could be administered to human
patients. Having identified and separated out the relevant sequence, the
scientists prepare a piece of carrier DNA into which they can splice the
relevant sequence. This carrier DNA is called a vector, and when the
relevant DNA sequence has been successfully spliced into the vector, the
resulting product is called a recombinant DNA. In the final steps, the
scientists cultivate a host cell capable of incorporating the recombinant
DNA. The host cell is primed with the proper materials so that the cell can
create the desired protein using the coding information from the relevant
DNA sequence.
Out of this enterprise, scientists might claim rights to the following
products: the isolated and purified DNA sequence, the recombinant DNA
that holds the sequence, and the transformed host cell that has incorporated
the recombinant DNA and produced the protein.4 5 Scientists hoping to
publish their work in a respected journal would recognize that the
40.
41.
42.

See KARL DRLICA, UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING 3 (3d ed. 1997).
See id. at 5, fig.1-2.
See id. at 2-3.

43.
See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 38, at 93; Kelly M. Jolley,
Reviews in Health Law: Patenting Technology Instead of Identity, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 524, 524

(2004) (book review). See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (noting that the parties had not technically invented a particular protein because the protein
existed naturally in the human body).
44. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (noting that the technical hurdle lies in determining the
sequence).
45.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS,

2002 CONFERENCE ON EXPLORING
(John V. Duca & Mine K. Yfcel eds., 2002).

SCIENCE AND CENTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 105,106
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publication could claim no more than the narrow task that had been
accomplished. For example, the scientists could claim as their own work no
more than the achievement of getting a particular carrier DNA to include
the sequence in a particular type of cell. One could publish that and no
more. The question for patent rights, however, is more expansive. Rights to
the invention described above, for example, would have little value if a
second comer could alter the vector slightly and escape the prior inventor's
work and the reach of the patent. Thus, patent rights to this type of
recombinant invention have been defined to include the isolated and
purified sequence in any vector and in any host cell that includes the
vector.46 Once again, analogous to the class of doorknobs, we are granting
rights to the class of carrier DNA segments, regardless of what materials
the carrier DNA is made up of. We grant these rights, however, in the face
of significant unknowns.
Consider, for example, noncoding regions of DNA. As described
above, the nucleotide building blocks of genes serve as blueprints for
constructing proteins or for starting and stopping the process of protein
production. Vast sequences of these nucleotide building blocks, however,
do not appear to serve any such purpose. Although these sequences exist in
the DNA, they drop out as DNA information is transferred through
different forms to create proteins. Scientists have dubbed these stretches
"noncoding" regions or "junk DNA. 4 7 For a quarter of a century, they
were considered irrelevant or evolutionary junk.4 8
In the last few years, however, researchers have uncovered striking
evidence that noncoding regions perform different but essential functions in
the human biologic process. 49 For example, scientists have determined that
changes in just two noncoding nucleotides determine whether a person is
50
lactose intolerant after weaning.
46.

See id. at 106.

47.

See W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, Sci. AM., Nov. 2003, at

48.
49.

See id.
See, e.g., id.; Sabine Schmitt & Renato Paro, A Reason for Reading Nonsense, 429 NATURE

48.

510

(2004); Misia

Landau, Junk DNA

Yields New Kind of Gene, Focus, June

4, 2004,

http://focus.hms.harvard.edu/2004/June4-2004/genetics.html.
50. C. Claiborne Ray, Q & A: DNA Junk or Not?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at F2, availableat
2003 WLNR 5167775 (describing the effects of changes in two sections of junk DNA).
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More importantly, many so-called noncoding regions code for RNA, 5
rather than proteins. Scientists are discovering that RNA performs essential
functions either alone or in conjunction with proteins, making these
52
noncoding regions essential to human function.
These discoveries will have little effect on patent rights granted under
many of the first generation gene patents. Such patents described the
sequences in the form of a later translation after the noncoding regions drop
out. Nevertheless, where patents have been granted for something that
encompasses the entire DNA sequence, including coding and noncoding
regions, the inventor may now control far more than imagined at the time
of the invention. Similarly, patents that grant control of a gene sequence
and a vector, or a host cell that encompasses the gene in a form that allows
it to continue to function, may be granting control of many hidden
substances and operations that we have yet to decipher.
Consider further patents related to antibodies. Antibodies defend
against infection by binding to viruses and toxins in our system and
interacting with such harmful agents to inactivate them. 53 Antibodies are
proteins produced by immune cells in response to instructions from the
active genes in those cells. 54 Knowing which antibody binds to a particular
disease agent, as well as manufacturing and manipulating such antibodies,
can be important in treating diseases ranging from AIDS to cancer to the
common cold.
Suppose that an inventor has isolated a particular disease-causing
agent, and we know that antibodies will bind to that agent in the human
system. Having isolated the harmful agent, the inventor then can claim
rights in all antibodies that will bind with the harmful agent. This is true
even if the inventor has not isolated and identified any of those
55
antibodies.
51. RNA (ribonucleic acid) is synthesized by transcription of DNA or by copying of RNA. The
three types of cellular RNA-mRNA, rRNA, and tRNA-play different roles in protein synthesis. See
HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY G- 15 (4th ed. 2000).

52. See Gibbs, supra note 47, at 48-49.
53. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 1375-76 (4th ed. 2002).
Without antibodies, a foreign agent, also called an antigen, would bind to our cells interfering with or
altering their activity. To prevent this, antibodies step in, bind to the foreign agent and interact with it,
rendering it harmless.
54. Each cell contains all of an individual's genes, but only certain genes will be activated in
each cell.
55. For example, in Noelle v. Lederman, the Federal Circuit commented that
based on our past precedent, as long as an applicant has disclosed a 'fully characterized
antigen,' either by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, or by
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The logic of granting these rights rests on combining the amount of
information we already know about antibodies with the information gained
once we have the harmful agent. We know much about the structure of
antibodies. For example, a typical antibody has a Y-shaped structure made
up of four chains of amino acids, two identical heavy chains, and two
56
identical light chains.
Ordinarily, we would not allow an applicant to claim something by its
function. 57 Thus, in the antibodies example, we would not allow a claim to
a group of things based on their propensity to bind with a particular agent.
Rather, we would require structural identification.5 8 The PTO will allow
this claim, however, on the basis of the functional information combined
with the structural information that we already have about antibodies in
general.59
The problem with granting rights in this area lies with the amount of
information we do not have. Although the general structural features of
antibodies were realized nearly four decades ago, there are slight
differences among antibodies that account for their ability to discriminate
among targets. The rules governing the development of these slight
differences remain elusive.
More importantly, different antibodies bind to different places on the
harmful agent and disarm the harmful agent in different ways. 60 In
addition, some antibodies may be more useful than others. For example,
some antibodies may bind with the harmful agent but fail to turn off its
damaging activity. Claims to the class of antibodies generally are not
limited to those that bind to the same place or perform in the same way.
depositing the protein in a public depository, the applicant can then claim an antibody by its
binding affinity to that described antigen.
Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying patent because the applicant not
only failed to describe the antibody, but also failed to describe the antigen to which it binds). Similarly,
the PTO Guidelines provide that if it is well known that antibodies may be made against any protein,
then the inventor may claim any antibody that binds to antigen X without specifically disclosing such
antibody. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SYNOPSIS OF APPLICATION OF WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES 59-60 (2001), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf.
56. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1376.
57. An exception to this rule is a means-plus-function claim.
58. See, e.g., Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1349.
59. Jennifer L. Davis, Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written
Description Requirement in BiotechnologicalPatents,20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
469, 478 (2004). See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
60. See ELI BENJAMINI, RICHARD COICO & GEOFFREY SUNSHINE, IMMUNOLOGY 65-79 (4th ed.
2000).
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Antibodies also may have cross-reactivity with harmful agents other
than the one identified in the invention. 6 1 Suppose that based on isolating
and identifying a harmful agent, an inventor claims all antibodies that bind
with that agent. Later, it turns out that one of these antibodies also binds
with something else or performs some other function unrelated to the
harmful agent. The inventor still holds rights to that antibody for any
operation and in any context.
The notion that later research may yield new information about
biological elements and processes is not merely theoretical. Consider the
case of Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.62 The case concerned patent rights
related to a particular leukocyte interferon. Leukocytes are white blood
cells and interferons are proteins that play important roles in fighting
viruses and tumors. 63 When the patent application was filed, scientists
viewed leukocyte interferons as a single category. 64 While the application
was pending, however, scientists determined that different species of
interferons exist. 65 This revelation led to a change in the scientific
terminology as well as questions for the Federal Circuit concerning how to
treat the patent.66
The examples above highlight the problems of granting rights in the
face of significant unknowns. In some cases, we know there are things we
do not know. In others, experience suggests science will show us things we
have never dreamed we did not know. Whether we are talking about known
unknowns or unknown unknowns, the patent system is faced with the
problem of granting rights in the face of incomplete information. This is
particularly true of biospace inventions in which we may never fully solve
the mystery of the human body and the intricate interactions of its myriad
parts and functions.
Waiting for full illumination is unlikely to produce the types of
incentives that would encourage scientists to continue the hunt. Despite the
extent of uncertainties and unknowns in biospace, inventors are creating
significant advances that provide tangible benefits to society and
substantially promote progress in the field.6 7 Given the commercial realities
61. See id. at 51-52.
62. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
63. Seeid. at 1349.
64. See id. at 1352.
65. See id.
66. See id. For a more detailed discussion of Schering v. Amgen, see infra notes 86-106 and
accompanying text.
67.

Cf Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to

BiotechnologicalInventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 649-52 (1998) (criticizing the decision in

HeinOnline -- 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15 2005-2006

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1

for biospace companies, the challenge is to craft rights in a way that has
some economic vitality and reflects the inventor's contribution without
reaching into unknown territory and hindering downstream innovation.
III. DOCTRINAL CHAOS

Although the one embodiment notion may make sense for mechanical
inventions, it leads to uncomfortable results for fields in which much is
unknown at the time of the invention. 68 Struggling with the implications of
the rule, courts have introduced a variety of doctrinal rules that stand in
contradiction to each other and point in different theoretical directions. In
particular, courts have failed to establish a consistent vision of whether the
definition of an invention includes anything beyond the state of the art at
the time of the invention. The tension appears both in doctrines related to
how far a patent holder can reach toward later inventions and how far a
patent holder can reach toward prior inventions.
A. How FAR CAN A PATENT HOLDER REACH TOWARD LATER
INVENTIONS?

On the question of whether the definition of an invention reaches
beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention, the contradictions
are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder can
reach toward later inventions. In this arena, some opinions conclude
broadly that one embodiment grants rights to all embodiments, even those
that could not have existed at the time of the invention. 69 Other opinions
apply claim construction doctrines to limit a patent holder's reach only to
embodiments that could have existed at the time of the invention.70 Still
others use a different set of doctrines to conclude that a patent holder's
reach sometimes can includes things beyond the state of the art at the time
71
of the invention and sometimes not.
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), on the
grounds that the resulting doctrine does not reflect the realities of scientific contribution).
68. For the purposes of this Article, I refer to the time of the invention. One could further
consider, however, whether the proper moment for measuring the time of the invention is the moment
of creation or the moment of the patent application.
69. See infra Part III.A. 1.
70. See infra Part III.A.2.
71. See infra Part I.A.3.
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1. The One Embodiment Doctrine Applied Broadly
For example, the Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. decision
in 2002 held broadly that one embodiment of an invention brings rights to
all embodiments of the invention, even those beyond the state of the art at
the time of the invention. 72 The Hoechst case concerned erythropoietin
("EPO"), a hormone that occurs naturally in the body and controls the
formation of red blood cells, which transport oxygen from the lungs to
other parts of the body. 73 An insufficient amount of red blood cells in the
blood can occur as a result of chronic kidney disease or heart disease, from
74
the effects of chemotherapy to treat cancer, and from other causes.
Increasing EPO in a patient's system can help raise the level of red blood
cells. 75 Early attempts to obtain EPO for treating patients involved
recovering EPO from surplus human blood or urine. The approach was
complicated and yielded only small amounts of EPO that were very impure
and highly unstable.76
Instead of purifying EPO from blood and urine, the patent holder in
Hoechst used genetic engineering techniques to produce large amounts of
the hormone. 7 7 The patent holder used information from the relevant
protein-the hormone EPO-to predict and create small DNA pieces,
which could be used to fish out the entire DNA sequence necessary for
producing EPO.7 8 Having isolated the full sequence, the patent holder

transferred it into a circular piece of carrier DNA. The carrier DNA was
then transferred into Chinese hamster ovary cells which could chum out
large amounts of EPO. 79 The patent holder received a patent covering a
variety of claims including a claim to "non-naturally occurring" EPO.8 °
Rather than the traditional recombinant techniques used by the patent
holder, the second inventor in Hoechst used a different approach to obtain
large amounts of EPO. The second inventor, in essence, figured out how to
spike the start and stop mechanisms that control the production of EPO in
72.
73.
74.

Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1321.
See id.

75.

See id.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See id.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (filed June 7, 1995).
Hoechst, 314 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1322.
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human cells.8 ' The inventor then used human cells in the lab to produce
large amounts of EPO that could be administered to patients.
The Federal Circuit considered whether the second inventor infringed
the first inventor's patent, which had been based on recombinant DNA
techniques. The court found infringement, choosing the broad notion of one
embodiment. 82 In particular, the court held that the first inventor's claims
covered any EPO other than the way nature intended it, and were not
limited to EPO produced from any particular source or by any particular
method.8 3 The court held further that for such product claims, the inventor
did not need to describe or enable technology that arises after the patent
application. 84 The court cited with approval the lower court's conclusion
that "the specification's failure to disclose the later-developed
technology cannot invalidate the patent. .. . '[T]he law makes clear that the

specification need teach only one mode of making and using a claimed
composition.' 85 In short, the Hoechst court allowed the footprint of the
invention to cover things beyond the state of the art at the time of the
invention.
2. Claim Construction
In contrast to the approach embraced by the Federal Circuit in
Hoechst, other Federal Circuit opinions have limited the forward reach of
the patent. For example, the Federal Circuit in Schering Corp. v. Amgen

Inc. used claim construction to limit the footprint of the patent to things
86
known at the time of the patent application.
The Schering case concerned proteins known as interferons that occur
naturally in the body and play an important role in fighting viruses and
tumors. 87 At the time of the invention, scientists knew of only two types of
interferons, those produced by leukocytes and those produced by
fibroblasts. 88 Leukocytes are white blood cells, while fibroblasts are a
81.
See id. at 1325-26.
82. See id. at 1328 (noting that "precedent is clear that claims are not perforce limited to the
embodiments disclosed in the specification").
83. See id. at 1329.
84. See id. at 1331 (regarding written description); id. at 1335 (regarding enablement).
85. See id. at 1335 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69,
160 (D. Mass. 2001)) (internal citation omitted). See also id. at 1338-39 (reiterating that the lower court
applied the proper logic by upholding the patent based on written description as well as enablement).
86. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
87. See id. at 1349. For example, in response to a viral infection, the body may secrete
interferons that bind to receptors on noninfected neighboring cells, inducing those cells to produce
proteins that increase the resistance to the infection. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 884.
88. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1349.
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common cell type found in connective tissue. 89 The patent holder filed
claims related broadly 90to leukocyte interferons, that is, any interferon
produced by white cells.
Interferons, however, turned out to have many more subtypes than
originally known, varying according to the strength of the activity they
engage in, the type of activity they engage in, and the type of receptors they
bind to. 9 1 Thus, the term "leukocyte interferon" covered many subtypes
beyond the one that the patent holder had manipulated in his experiments.
As information about the various subtypes came to light, a committee
of scientists adopted new terminology to describe interferons according to
factors such as the type of cell that produces them, their binding affinity,
and certain physical properties. 92 Following the nomenclature change, the
inventor amended his patent application to remove the term "leukocyte
interferons" and substitute the term interferons of the "IFN-ct type." At the
time of the amendment, however, even the term "IFN-a" included
the one that the
numerous subtypes of interferons that differed from
93
successfully.
manipulated
and
isolated
inventor had
The Federal Circuit panel in Schering expressed admiration for the
patent holder's invention, describing the experiments as "elegant" and the
work as "pioneering." 94 Nevertheless, the court limited the reach of the
invention, confining it95to the limits of scientific knowledge at the time of
the patent application.
To reach its limiting result, the Federal Circuit panel used doctrines
related to claim construction. Traditionally, patent cases begin with an
examination of the meaning of the terms in the patent. Words in the patent
are parsed to try to divine their precise definition in the context of the
patent. This determination, known as claim construction, proceeds as a
89.

See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1284.

90. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1350. The patent holder successfully isolated the gene that codes
for an interferon, creating recombinant molecules that contained the genes and could be transferred to
host cells to continue producing the desired interferon. The patent claimed recombinant molecules that
contain the gene and genetically engineered microorganisms that contain such molecules. See id. at
1350-51.
Shahla Al-Hasso, Interferons: An Overview, U.S. PHARMACIST, June 2001, http://www.
91.
uspharmacist.com/oldformat.asp?url=newlook/files/Feat/interferons.htm&pub-id=8&article-id=73 1.
92. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352. See also Al-Hasso, supra note 91.
93. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353-54.
94. See id. at 1349.
95. See id. at 1353 (finding that the term in the patent could not enlarge the patent's scope to
include technology arising after its filing).
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matter of law.96 The relevant hearings are called "Markman hearings," after
the 1996 Supreme Court case holding that claim construction does not
reside within the purview of the jury. 97 Thus, claim construction issues are
decided by the trial judge, and appellate courts review such issues de novo
without deference to the trial court's decision. 98 Once the patent claims
have been construed, those accused of infringing the patent generally
defend along two lines of argument: (1) that the claims are invalid, or (2)
that the accused product does not infringe the claims as interpreted.
Claim construction was the sole issue on appeal in Schering.99 In the
process of defining the claim terms, the court declared that claim terms are
not permitted to embrace technology arising after the patent application.' 0 0
The court found that "[t]he term as used in the ...

patent ...

did not and

could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace technology arising
after its filing."'' 1 With this simple declaration, the court limited the
footprint of the invention to the state of the art at the time of the
application. In essence, the court limited the reach of the invention,
freezing it to include only scientific knowledge available when the
application was filed.
The Schering court did not directly address the theoretical question of
how far the footprint of the patent should extend and why we might make
that choice. Rather, the court accomplished the limitation indirectly in its
application of the rules of claim construction. Having declared that claim
terms cannot reach forward to things arising after the application, the court
proceeded to save the claim by reading limitations into it, adopting an
inspired interpretation.
Both the terms used in the original claim and in the amended claim
appeared to include subtypes discovered after the time of the invention,
which the court had suggested was problematic. Normally, words in a
claim should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning in the art at
96. Phillip B. Philbin & Carmen E. Griffin, Intellectual Property Law, 58 SMU L. REV. 985, 986
(2005).
97. See, e.g., Schering, 222 F.3d at 1351 (referring to the "pre-trial Markman hearing"). See also
Markman v. Westwiew Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996). For a detailed description of the
widely varying district court procedural rules for Markman hearings, see JANICE M. MUELLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 232-34 (2003).

98.

See, e.g., Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (establishing de novo

appellate review for claim construction).
99. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1349 (noting that the plaintiff appeals only the district court's
claim construction).
100.
Id. at 1353.
101.
Id.
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the time.' 0 2 A court may overlook the ordinary meaning of a term,
however, if the patent applicant expressly designates a particular definition
for the term.10 3 In amending his patent, the Schering applicant stated that
"[i]n this application the interferon nomenclature announced in Nature...
is used. E.g., leukocyte interferon is designated IFN-a.' ' 10 4 The court read
this sentence from the amendment as expressing a broad intent to limit the
claim to what was known at the time of the invention. 105
This interpretation is somewhat strained. The declaration in the
amendment stops far short of declaring a limitation on the ordinary
meaning of terms. It is a substantial leap to conclude that the act of
narrowing the size of a group is the same as expressly limiting the claim to
what could have been known at the time of the invention. More
importantly, although the applicant narrowed the group, he still chose a
group larger than what was known at the time of the invention. 106 Thus, it
is difficult to understand how choosing a group that reaches beyond what
was known at the time of the invention evidences an intent to limit the
claim to what was known at the time of the invention.
Nevertheless, the court interpreted that sentence as expressly limiting
the claims to the specific science and knowledge at the time of the
invention. The court, therefore, found a way to declare that the terms did
not mean what they said, and that the claim was limited only to subtypes
that could have been known at the time of the invention. In the process, the
court suggested something about the proper footprint of the patent. The
opinion suggested that as scientists discover and distinguish variations of
the product, the footprint should be limited to the science at the time of the
invention. This approach stands in contrast with the opinion delivered three
years later in Hoechst, which embraces the broad notion of one
embodiment and allows the patent holder to reach embodiments and
variations beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.
102. See, e.g., Bell Atd. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,
1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
103. See Schering, 222 F.3d at1353.
104. Id.at 1352 (internal citation omitted).
105. See id.
at 1353 (finding that the patentee expressly limited the meaning of the term IFN-ct to
define only the leukocyte interferon described in the original application).
106. At the time of the amendment, scientists already knew that LFN-a itself had subtypes beyond
what had been known at the time of the invention. Even the Nature article cited in the amendment
mentions subtypes of IFN-a interferons. See id. at 1352-53.
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3. Disclosure Doctrines
In contrast to both Hoechst and Schering, the decision in Chiron Corp.
v. Genentech Inc. 10 7 used a different set of doctrines to address a patent
holder's ability to reach embodiments that could not have been known at
the time of the invention. Applying these doctrines, Chiron suggested a
definition of the footprint of the invention that is inconsistent with both of
the prior cases.
The Chiron case concerned claims to monoclonal antibodies used in
the treatment and diagnosis of breast cancer. 10 8 As described above,
antibodies are Y-shaped proteins that defend the human body against
harmful agents, such as viruses and toxins, by binding with such agents and
interfering with their activity.109 We generally refer to such harmful agents
1 10
as antigens.
About twenty-five percent of breast cancer tumors express unusually
high levels of a protein named Her2."'1 This fact suggests that Her2 plays a
role in sustaining the development of the cancerous cells. 1 12 By blocking
the activity of Her2, scientists hope to prevent the growth of the cancerous
cells that may depend on it. 113 In particular, breast cancer patients may
benefit from doses of antibodies that bind to and interfere with Her2.114
The challenge for scientists is producing a sufficient supply of stable
antibodies that the human body can accept. As described above, antibodies
vary in terms of where they bind to an agent, the way in which they interact
with the agent, and the effectiveness of that interaction. 115 Monoclonal
antibodies, however, are created using populations of identical cells that are
developed to secrete a single type of antibody. 116 Given that a single
107.
108.
109.

Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1250.
See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1375-76. See also supra text accompanying notes 53-

110.

See DONALD VOET, JUDITH G. VOET & CHARLOrrE W. PRAT-r,

56.
FUNDAMENTALS OF

BIOCHEMISTRY 187 (rev. ed. 2002).
111.

See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1358.

112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing
Genentech's product, Herceptin, which binds to a particular human breast cancer antigen inhibiting the
growth of cancerous cells).
115. See supratext accompanying note 91.
116.

See VOETET AL.,supra note 110, at 189.
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antibody is produced, the antibody will bind to a specific site on an antigen
1 17
and interact with the antigen in a consistent manner.
The science of producing antibodies advanced dramatically in 1975
with the development of hybridomas. 118 Ordinarily, the immune system
cells that produce antibodies have a limited life span in the lab. Thus,
although a population of homogenous cells producing a single antibody
could be developed, the cells would die out, making it difficult to produce
large amounts of a single, consistent antibody. Hybridoma technology,
which involves fusing the desired immune cells with tumor cells, creates
the capacity to replicate indefinitely. 119
Early antibody populations were produced from hybridomas using
mouse cells. 120 Such antibodies could not be administered long-term to
humans because the patient's immune system would eventually attack the
mouse antibodies, risking toxic shock or death. 121 In response, scientists
turned to antibodies created from DNA encoding materials combined from
different species.' 22 In other words, the arms of the Y antibody may be
created by genetic coding regions from a mouse while the tail of the Y may
be created by genetic coding regions from a human. Antibodies created in
this combined fashion are called "chimeric" antibodies. 23 "Humanized"
antibodies are created predominantly from human genetic coding materials,
24
although they may contain some nonhuman portions.'
The patent holder in Chiron produced monoclonal antibodies that bind
to the human breast cancer antigen Her2. 125 The original application
disclosed one antibody, prepared using a hybridoma developed from
mice. 126 Later versions of the application disclosed additional monoclonal
antibodies that also bind to Her2, again produced by other hybridomas
developed from mice.1 27 Some of the variations revealed in the later
versions of the application had binding affinities for different locations on
128
Her2.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 53, at 476.
See id.
See id.
See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1250.

123.

Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1251.
See id. at 1251-52.
See id.
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The patent claimed all monoclonal antibodies that bind to Her2.129 The
patent defined "monoclonal antibody" in the application as not limited in
regards to the source or manner in which it is made. 130 In other words, the
product of the patent application was defined as all antibodies that bind to
the Her2 target, no matter how the antibody is derived, as long as it is
13 1
derived other than the way in which nature intended.
The patent holder sued a company making a product called
"Herceptin," a humanized antibody used in the long-term treatment of
breast cancer. 3 2 Neither chimeric nor humanized antibodies existed at the
time of the original patent application. 133 Thus, the patent holder was
attempting to extend the footprint of the patent to embodiments beyond the
state of the art at the time of the patent application.
In analyzing the claim, the Federal Circuit chose an entirely different
path than either of the paths taken before. The Hoechst court refused to
limit a patent holder's reach to embodiments that could have existed at the
time of the patent, remaining faithful to the one embodiment notion. The
Schering court did limit a patent holder's reach and used claim construction
doctrines to accomplish that limitation. The Chiron court also limited a
patent holder's reach, but not by claim construction. Rather, the Chiron
court limited a patent holder's reach using disclosure doctrines.
As described above, patent cases begin with an inquiry into the
meaning of the words in the claims. Once claim construction is completed,
an accused infringer generally proceeds by claiming that the patent is
invalid and that the accused product does not infringe. To establish validity,
a patent holder traditionally must show proper subject matter, utility,
novelty, nonobviousness, and proper disclosure. 134 The Chiron court chose
to limit the footprint of the patent using doctrines related to proper
disclosure.
Disclosure is governed by § 112 of the Patent Act. This section
provides that the patent shall contain "a written description of the
invention.., in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id. Although the case did not discuss this aspect of the claim, presumably the claim was
intended to reach all antibodies that bind to Her2 regardless of their binding location or method of
interaction with Her2.
132. See id. at 1252.
133. Seeid. at1251.
134. See generally MUELLER, supra note 97 (describing each element).
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connected, to make and use the same." 135 The disclosure requirement is the
patent holder's payment in the bargain of granting a patent. The
government confers patent rights for a limited time in anticipation that
society later will receive the full benefit of the knowledge of those
inventions.' 36 Disclosure guarantees that society receives the benefit of the
patent holder's knowledge.
In addition, early cases suggested that the disclosure requirements of §
112 and its predecessors not only guaranteed society's proper reward, but
also served to notify others of the rights claimed. 137 More recent cases have
expanded the role of § 112 from explanation and notice to determining
whether the inventor possessed the invention claimed. 3 8 To accomplish
this expansion, the Federal Circuit in 1997 in Regents of the University of
Californiav. Eli Lilly & Co. 13 9 identified within the disclosure language of
§ 112 two separate requirements, one for enablement and one for written
description. 140 Enablement would continue to ensure that the public has
sufficient information to understand and practice the invention, while
written description would ensure that patent applicants possessed what they
wished to claim.1
The new written description test is couched in terms of performing an
accurate accounting of what the inventor actually possessed and when. 142 A
court, however, cannot determine what an inventor possessed at a given
time without making assumptions about how far a particular invention can
reach. The new written description jurisprudence, therefore, has become
the battleground for indirect struggles over how far a patent holder can
reach. 143 It is within this context that the Chiron court uses written
description to reduce the footprint of the patent for biotechnology
inventions.
In Chiron, the patent holder tried to reach embodiments of the
invention that could not have been accomplished at the time of the patent
135. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 219 (1832) (noting that description ensures that
after the privilege expires, the public receives the benefit for which the privilege was granted).
137. See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 433-34 (1822).
138. For a description of the evolving role of § 112, see Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor's
Contribution, 9 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6 (2005).

139. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
140. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921-22 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g
and reh 'g en banc denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J. dissenting) (describing the Lilly
case), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 629 (2004).
141. See id. at 926 (defending the current written description doctrine).
142. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
143. See Feldman, supra note 138, at 51.
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application.'" The appeal centered on whether the patent holder's original
application satisfied § 112.141 On this question, the court faced precedent
from the cases of In re Hogan146 and Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v.
47

DeKalb Genetics Corp.1

Hogan was decided by the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit and
concerned an invention in the field of chemistry. 148 Although the original
patent application in Hogan was filed in 1953, amendments and
continuations reached across two decades, with the PTO finally rejecting
the version of the application submitted in 1971.1"9 Under the Patent Act,
an applicant can amend its patent but may not add any new matter to the
0
application.15
In its rejection, the PTO objected that later incarnations of the
application included versions of the original chemical that could not have
existed decades before when the original application was filed. 15 1 Thus, the
PTO objected on the ground that the rights sought reached far beyond the
52
invention as defined in the original disclosure of the patent. 1
In reversing the PTO, the Hogan court held that a patent applicant
need not enable later developed technology, arguing that such a limitation
would place an intolerable burden on a patent holder's ability to claim
broadly. 153 With this approach, the Hogan court embraced a broad view of
the footprint of a patent, allowing the reach to extend to embodiments
beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention.
Grappling with the Hogan language twenty-five years later, a Federal
Circuit panel in Plant Genetic Systems suggested that Hogan itself could be
limited. 154 As the court explained, "We do not read Hogan as allowing an
inventor to claim what was specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the
time the application was filed, unless the patent discloses how to make and
use it." 155 Under the approach outlined in Plant Genetic Systems, patent
144.
145.

See Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1251.
Id. at 1252 (framing the case as an appeal from determinations concerning written description

and enablement).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See id.
Id. at 597.
See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000).
In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 600.

152.
153.
154.
155.

See id. at 600-01.
See id. at 606.
Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1340-41.
Id. at 1340.
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holders do not have to enable embodiments completely unknown at the
time of the patent, but must enable embodiments
that were desired but
56
difficult to obtain at the time of the patent.
This reading of Hogan attempts to rein in a broad footprint that would
allow patent holders to reach forward to embodiments that could not have
been known at the time of the invention. After all, by reading Hogan in this
fashion, the court changed the law from allowing patent holders to reach all
embodiments beyond the state of the art to reaching only some
embodiments beyond the state of the art. The limitation, however, has a
perverse effect. In designing a coherent vision of the footprint of the
invention, one would expect to reduce a patent holder's reach as
technology advances farther away from what was known at the time of the
patent. The more the science advances, the more we would anticipate that
new products are substantially different from what the patent holder
accomplished and, therefore, should not be covered by the patent. Thus, we
would expect to create the strongest limits on a patent holder's reach for
embodiments that are the farthest from the state of the art at the time of the
invention.
The Plant Genetic Systems limitation, however, has the opposite
effect. A patent holder's reach is most clearly protected in the case of
advancements that are beyond anyone's imagination at the time of the
invention. The patent holder's reach is denied for technology that is closer
to the art at the time. Thus, the patent holder has more control over things
vastly beyond the state of the art and less control for things close to the
state of the art. This is the opposite of the effect that one would logically
impose because courts again are looking for stop-gap measures to limit a
patent holder's reach, rather than developing a comprehensive view of what
should be protected.
Plant Genetic Systems suggested that a patent holder's ability to reach
beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention could be limited
through the enablement doctrine. Two months later, the Chiron court
followed Plant Genetic Systems, finding that patent holders are required to
enable some, but not all, embodiments beyond the state of the art at the
57
time of the invention.'
The Chiron court went further, however, in its application of the
written description doctrine. Regarding written description, the Chiron
court ruled that the patent holder could not possibly have described what
156.

See id.

157.

See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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did not exist in the art at the time of the invention. 158 Thus, the Chiron

court ruled that patent holders who try to reach to embodiments beyond the
state of the art at the time of the invention will fail on written description
grounds, even if they survive enablement. At the end of the day in Chiron,
therefore, patent holders can never reach embodiments beyond the state of
the art at the time of the invention. The case, however, adopts a number of
strange twists to reach that result and stands in contradiction to other cases.
The author of the Chiron opinion, Judge Rader, has railed against the
Federal Circuit's elevation of written description to the level of a separate
test in § 112 jurisprudence. 159 In fact, Judge Rader continued his strenuous
objections a few months after Chiron in his dissent from the Federal
Circuit's refusal to take a written description case en banc. 160 In particular,
Judge Rader argued that the Federal Circuit's current separation of written
description and enablement leaves juries with the cumbersome task of
deciding that "the patent's disclosure can enable a skilled artisan to make
and practice the entire invention, but still not inform that same artisan that
the inventor was in possession of the invention." 161 Nevertheless, the
separation of written description and enablement was a happy circumstance
for Judge Rader in Chiron, providing the vehicle for blunting the impact of
Hogan.

Regardless of the technical conflicts concerning how the written
description doctrine operates or how it fits with the enablement doctrine,
the more serious conflicts are theoretical. Across a broad range of
doctrines, the courts have adopted entirely inconsistent visions of the
proper footprint of the invention and how far an inventor can reach toward
things that come after the invention. The Hoechst court suggested broadly
that a patent holder can reach to all embodiments, including those that
could not have existed at the time of the invention. The Schering court
suggested through claim construction that a patent holder cannot reach to
things that could not have existed at the time of the invention. The Hogan
court suggested through enablement that a patent holder can reach to
unknown embodiments. The Plant Genetic Systems suggested through
enablement that a patent holder could reach some, but not all embodiments
158. See id. at 1255 (finding that the patent holder could not have described antibodies beyond the
state of the art at the time of the invention).
159. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322-27 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader,
J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976-83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader,
J., dissenting).
160. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307-14 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
161. Moba, 325 F.3d at 1323.
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that could not have existed at the time of the invention. Finally, the Chiron
court suggested through written description that a patent holder cannot
reach any embodiments that could not have been known at the time of the
invention.
B. How FAR CAN A PATENT HOLDER REACH TOWARD EARLIER
CREATIONS?

The section above described how defining an invention to include
things beyond the state of the art at the time of the invention has led to
chaos in the doctrines concerning how far a patent holder can reach toward
later inventions. The same expansive notion is wreaking havoc in doctrines
related to how far a patent holder can reach toward earlier creations,
whether created by nature or by other inventors.
Ordinarily, a patent applicant's reach is constrained by prior art.
Patents are granted only for new inventions, not for things that are already
available in the science.' 62 If an invention already exists, it is not novel, but
163
rather "anticipated by the prior art."
Traditionally, to argue that a current invention was anticipated by
prior art, one had to point to a single piece of prior art and find all of the
elements of the current invention within the four corners of that prior art.
Courts have broadened the classic definition of anticipation, however, to
include references to what a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand. Thus, even when a piece of prior art does not describe a
particular element of the claimed invention, the prior art may still anticipate
if a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the prior art
reference to include the element. 164 Therefore, if a person of skill in the art
would have understood the element to be included in the prior art, the prior
65
art anticipates. 1
162. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
163. See I CHISUM, supra note 31, § 3.02[l].
164. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
165. Similarly, although the test for anticipation requires a single reference and should not
combine prior references, a court may look at additional references to interpret what a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d
1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that recourse to extrinsic evidence is permissible to determine if a
feature is necessarily present, even if not discussed). Understandably, courts have experienced some
difficulty in distinguishing between the use of extrinsic evidence to explain a piece of prior art, which is
permissible, and combining two pieces of prior art, which is not. See I CHISUM, supra note 31, §
3.02[l][d] n.26 (citing discussion of this dilemma in the case of Fenton Golf Trust v. Cobra Golf, Inc.,
No. 97 C 247, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452 (N.D. fI1. 1998)).
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Some opinions broaden the anticipation standard even farther, finding
that a prior art reference can anticipate if the necessary element is inherent
in the prior invention, even if those of ordinary skill in the art could not
have recognized the element. 16 6 This interpretation expands the definition
of anticipation beyond what one skilled in the art would know to things that
are entirely unknown but contained in the invention.
For example, in Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc., the

court found that anticipation by prior art does not require recognition as
long as the necessary element is inherent in the prior invention. 167 Geneva
concerned a patented antihistamine that is the active ingredient in the
popular allergy medicine, Claritin. 168 Unlike the other antihistamines that
were available at the time of the invention, the Claritin antihistamine did
169
not cause drowsiness.
Six years after receiving the patent on the Claritin antihistamine, the
patent holder also received a patent on DCL, a metabolite of its
antihistamine. 170 A metabolite is a compound formed in a patient's body.
As a patient's body digests, or metabolizes, a medicine, the medicine is
chemically converted into a new compound, known as a metabolite. 7 '
Scholars have expressed concern over patent holders' attempts to
refresh their patents by patenting updated versions, alternative delivery
methods, or other variations of the original product. This practice is
referred to as "evergreening," 172 and one could argue that patenting
metabolites is a form of evergreening.
When the patent on the Claritin antihistamine expired, generic
versions entered the market. The patent holder sued the generics on the
166. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In
re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002); MEHL/ Biophile Int'l Corp. v.
Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also I CHiSUM, supra note 31, § 3.03[2][c].
167. Geneva, 339 F.3d at 1373.
168. See id. at 1375.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1375-76 (explaining that the antihistamine patent issued in 1981, while the
metabolite patent issued in1987).
at 1375.
171. See id.
Jean 0. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and
172. See, e.g.,
International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 94-95 (2002) (defining the term); Robert M.
Schulman, A Review of Significant 2003 Federal Circuit Decisions Affecting Chemical,
Pharmaceutical,and Biotech Inventions, 16 No. 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 1, 6 (2004) (same). See also
Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book
Strategic Behavior artd PharmaceuticalInnovation, 45 IDEA 165, 185-88 (2005) (using the term);
Recent Development, Columbia, Co-transformation, Commercialization and Controversy: The Axel
Patent Litigation, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 583, 603 (2004) (same).
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grounds that although the antihistamine patent had expired, the generics
73
infringed the metabolite patent, which still had six years to go.1
The court had to determine whether the metabolite patent was invalid
because of prior art. 17 4 The relevant prior art was the original Claritin
antihistamine. 175 Thus, the key question concerned whether an invention is
anticipated by prior art if the element is present in the operation of the prior
art, despite the fact that those skilled in the prior art would not have
76
recognized it. 1
The Geneva court found that anticipation by prior art does not require
recognition.' 77 In other words, a prior art reference can anticipate if all
elements are contained in the prior art, even if a person of ordinary skill in
the art would not have been able to recognize the disputed element as part
of the invention.178 Thus, the antihistamine anticipated the metabolite
because the metabolite compound was inherently formed during the
operation of the antihistamine invention, even though those of ordinary
skill in the art did not know of this at the time of the antihistamine patent.
Another Federal Circuit panel reached a similar conclusion in In re
Cruciferous Sprout Litigation.'79 Cruciferous concerned a patent for a
method of lowering the risk of developing cancer by selecting for particular
vegetable seeds that would grow plants containing high levels of
substances thought to reduce the risk of developing cancer. 180 The
substances, glucosinolates, encourage the body to produce certain enzymes
that are part of the body's mechanism for detoxifying agents that have the
potential to cause cancer. 18 1 The inventors recognized that the amount of
the desired substances varies from one broccoli plant to another. 182 The
inventors, therefore, suggested sorting through the seeds of particular plants
to select those that will produce high levels of the desired substances and
assembling them into a food product to reduce cancer in humans and
173. See Geneva, 339 F.3d at 1375-76 (describing the timing of the patents and identifying the
patent at issue in the suit).
174. See id. at 1376.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1377.
177. See id. (finding that "[a]t the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation
requires recognition in the prior art").
178. See id. (holding that "recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical
date of the [metabolite] patent is not required to show anticipation by inherency").
179. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
180. See id. at 1345.
181.
See id.
182. See id.
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for treating cancer, not a new
animals. 183 The patent claimed a new method
84
method for growing or harvesting sprouts.'
The Federal Circuit panel found that the invention was anticipated by
the prior art of harvesting this class of vegetables for general human
consumption. 85 The patent holder tried to argue that even if the prior art
included eating your vegetables, nothing in the art identified the particular
vegetables with the desired substances or suggested assembling a food
product from the cultivated seeds that contained particularly high quantities
186
of the substance.
The court, however, concluded that all of the invention was inherent in
the prior art. 18 7 A person eating vegetables would have eaten some
vegetables with high quantities of the desired substances. Thus, there was
nothing new in directing people to do something that had been done before.
As the court explained, "[The patent holder] cannot credibly maintain that
no one has heretofore grown and eaten one of the many suitable [particular
188
seeds] identified by its patents."'
The court ruled, therefore, that prior art can anticipate even if those of
ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized the inherent
characteristics or functions.' 8 9 "Stated differently, a sprout's glucosinolate
content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential are inherent characteristics
of the sprout. It matters not that those of ordinary skill heretofore
may not
' 90
sprouts."'
the
of
characteristics
inherent
these
recognized
have
As described above, the classic test for finding that an invention is
anticipated by the prior art requires that a single piece of art contain all
elements of the claimed invention. Courts have eased this requirement by
consideration of what a person skilled in the art would have understood as
inherent in the invention. The Geneva and Cruciferous cases ease the
requirement even further by finding that a prior art reference can anticipate
if the necessary elements are inherent in the invention, even if one skilled
in the art would not have recognized or appreciated those elements.
183.

See id.

184. Id. at 1345-46 (describing the patent claim); id. at 1350 (noting that the patent holder "does
not claim to have invented a new kind of sprout, or a new way of growing or harvesting sprouts").
185. See id. at 1351 (noting that the prior art teaches sprouting and harvesting the very same seeds
that the patents recognize as producing vegetables rich in the desired substance).
186. See id. at 1349.
187. See id. at 1349-50.
188. Id. at 1351.
189. Seeid. at 1350.
190. Id. at 1350 (internal citation omitted).
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Not all Federal Circuit panels, however, embrace the view that prior
art can anticipate even if those skilled in the art would not have recognized
the elements. Some Federal Circuit decisions have held, to the contrary,
that prior art can anticipate only if the element or characteristic would have
been recognized by those skilled in the art. 191

The notion that an invention encompasses things inherent but
unknown is consistent with the one embodiment concept. In both concepts,
the footprint of the invention is defined broadly to include things beyond
the state of knowledge at the time of the invention. With the inherency
cases, Federal Circuit opinions again struggle with the implications of
applying such a wide footprint, with some cases ruling that prior art
includes things unrecognized in the arts and others declining to do so.
Within the opinions that allow inherency for unknown elements, one
can see an instinct to limit what can be patented by expanding the notion of
prior art. In Cruciferous, for example, the court denied patent coverage by
finding that the invention existed inherently in common activities.1 92 In
Geneva, the court denied patent coverage by finding that the invention
existed inherently in the applicant's own prior inventions. 193 This suggests
an effort to limit the ability of inventors to lock up rights by granting a
large footprint to what has come before.
This approach, however, eventually expands what can be patented
rather than limiting it. If the definition of a piece of prior art includes
unknown elements, then the inventor holding the patent on that piece of
prior art should be able to define the invention to reach those unknown
elements as well. After all, an invention is what an invention is. Why
define an invention one way for one set of doctrines and another way for
another set of doctrines?
Altering the inherency doctrine so that prior inventions are defined to
include elements beyond what those in the art recognize creates an
191.
See ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that to anticipate,
a prior art reference must describe with sufficient clarity that the subject matter was recognized by
persons of ordinary skill in the art); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(noting that a disclosure may anticipate by inherency when it would be appreciated by one of ordinary
skill in the art); Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See
also I CHISUM, supra note 31, § 3.03[2][c] (noting that Federal Circuit opinions have oscillated on the
question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art must recognize the existence of an inherent
feature of prior art). Cf In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998-99 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (finding lack of
anticipation because the claimed product, if produced in the prior art process, was produced in such
miniscule amounts and under such conditions that its presence was undetectable).
192.

See In re Cruciferous Sprout, 301 F.3d at1351-52.

193.

See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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expansive reach for all patent holders. Thus, an effort to rein in patenting in
some cases has the perverse effect of expanding the footprint of patents in
general.
In short, the inherency doctrine suggests defining an invention to
include things beyond the knowledge of the inventor or the state of the art
at the time of the invention. Although this arises in the context of how far
an inventor can reach toward prior inventions, logically it should also apply
in the context of how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions. In
fact, a recent Federal Circuit opinion made this logical connection. 194 The
opinion takes inherency questions, in other words, those related to how far
an inventor can reach toward earlier inventions, and links them to the
doctrines concerning how far an inventor can reach toward later inventions.
Thus, the opinion confirms the inextricable link between defining an
invention for the purposes of delineating prior art and defining an invention
for the purposes of delineating future art.
Specifically, in Elan Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research, a Federal Circuit panel found that when

anticipation is based on inherency, the information must have been known
in the art.195 This opinion, therefore, followed the line of cases denying
inherency for unknown elements, in contrast to cases such as Cruciferous
and Geneva. Following publication of the opinion, the full Federal Circuit
initially agreed to rehear the case en banc. 196 The court withdrew the en
avoiding the
banc order, however, when the panel reissued the 9opinion
7
question of whether inherency must be recognizable. 1
The original panel opinion had upheld the patent, adopting a narrow
view of prior art by finding that prior art cannot anticipate unless the
elements are recognized. 198 The reissued opinion similarly upheld the
patent but avoided all discussion of inherency. Rather, in the reissued
opinion, the court found that prior art does not anticipate if the prior art is
not enabled. 199
194. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Elan Pharms. 1), 304 F.3d
1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated by 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
195. See id. at 1228.
196. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Elan Pharms. II), 314 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
197. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Elan Pharms. 111), 346 F.3d
1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (replacement opinion).
198. See Elan Pharms. 1,304 F.3d at 1228.
199. See Elan Pharms. 111, 346 F.3d at 1054. This holding fits logically with enablement's
traditional role of ensuring that an inventor adequately teaches those skilled in the art how to practice
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Although the final Elan opinion pursued a perfectly logical
connection, the opinion makes the circle of confusion in this area complete.
First, the results in Elan conflict with the cases finding that anticipation
does not require recognition. Under those cases, prior art with
unrecognized qualities anticipates, while under Elan, prior art with
unrecognized qualities does not anticipate. The Federal Circuit cannot
solve the conflicts in the inherency doctrine by deflecting questions into
another doctrine. The results are still in conflict, in terms of whether the
footprint of the invention can reach back to cover prior unrecognized
elements.
Second, current conflicts within the enablement doctrine itself will
lead to further confusion on the question of whether an inventor can reach
back toward unrecognized elements. As described above, the enablement
doctrine is itself in disarray in terms of whether an inventor can reach
things that could not have been known at the time of the invention. Hoechst
and Hogan hold that an inventor need not enable information that could not
have been known at the time of the invention, while Chiron and Plant
Genetic Systems hold that an inventor must enable some but not all of such
information. 200 Tossing the inherency question into that realm places it at
the center of opinions that point in different directions and guarantees
further confusion.
Finally, if a prior art reference must satisfy the enablement doctrine in
order to anticipate, then it must also satisfy written description. If a prior art
reference must be described to anticipate, then the conflicts throughout
both sets of doctrines will be complete. The same question of whether an
inventor can reach back to unrecognized elements would be decided in a
variety of ways depending upon which doctrinal box the court uses to
frame the question and which line of cases the court follows. If decided
based on inherency, some cases would find that the prior art anticipated
even though there was no recognition in the art, and some would find the
eie based on enablement, some cases would suggest that
opposite. 201 IIf decided
the prior art may anticipate despite lack of knowledge by those skilled in
the art, 20 2 and others would disagree with this proposition. 203 Still others
the invention. If a patent reference, for example, serves to bring something into the prior art so that
future inventors cannot claim it, then that reference must actually teach those skilled in the art how to
accomplish the invention. See id. at 1056-57.
200. See supra Part III.A.
201.
See supra notes 165-89, 194-99 and accompanying text.
202. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re
Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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would suggest that the prior art may anticipate only if there is total lack of
of knowledge is
knowledge by those skilled in the art, but not if the level
20 4
such that the element was desired but difficult to obtain.
If decided based on written description, some cases would suggest that
the prior art may anticipate despite lack of knowledge by those skilled in
the art,20 5 while others would suggest that this is not the case.2 °6 And again,
one case would suggest prior art may anticipate only if there is total lack of
knowledge by those skilled in the art but not if the level of knowledge is
such that the element was desired but difficult to obtain. 20 7 Those who hold
patents or challenge them could be assured only of a complete inability to
predict the answer to the question.
Most importantly, the convergence of these areas demonstrates the
futility of addressing the issue piecemeal. The courts cannot simply
resolve, for example, whether inherency includes unrecognized elements.
Any decision there, no matter what, leaves conflicts in the areas of written
description, claim construction, and enablement that will wrap back around
into the inherency inquiry.
The temptation to define prior art as including inherent elements is
strong. It provides the instant gratification of shutting down certain types of
evergreening such as metabolite claims. 20 8 That satisfaction, however,
comes at the cost of exacerbating chaos across the doctrines. In addition,
there are other approaches available for reining in those who would extend
20 9
their patents through metabolite claims.
From another perspective, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley suggest that
the inherency cases can be understood differently from the way in which
they are currently interpreted in the field. 2 10 According to Burk and
Lemley, the cases actually turn on whether society is already using and
203. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Cf Schering
Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
204. See, e.g., Chiron, 363 F.3d 1247; Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
205.

See, e.g., Hoechst, 314 F.3d 1313.

206. Cf Schering, 222 F.3d 1347.
207. Chiron, 363 F.3d 1247.
208. See Derzko, supra note 172, at 221 (noting that the court's holding in Schering Corp. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc. will eliminate some types of metabolite claims and that to the extent
metabolite claims constitute evergreening, the case will dampen incentives for certain forms of
evergreening).
209. See Feldman, supra note 138, at 46.
210. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 3, on file with author) (arguing that confusion in inherency law is unnecessary
given that the facts of inherency cases offer a simple way to understand them).
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receiving the benefit of an element, not whether the element was
unrecognized. 2 1 1 In other words, the rule should be that if the public
already benefits from an invention, even if they do not know about it, that
212
invention is inherent in the prior art.
The public use and benefit rule has the advantage of threading a line
carefully through some of the trickier inherency cases. 2 13 Problems with the
approach emerge, however, when doctrines throughout the area are
considered as a whole.
For example, recall that in Geneva, a pharmaceutical company tried to
extend its patent on a drug by patenting the compound formed by the
patient's body when the drug was digested.2 14 The public use and benefit
rule would deny a patent on the compound. The theory would be that the
compound was already being formed in the body, and the public, at least
those taking the drug, already had the benefit of it.
The pharmaceutical company's invention, however, looks very much
like many of the gene and protein inventions that commonly receive
patents. For example, the pharmaceutical company determined that the
body formed a substance. The company isolated and purified the substance,
identified its structure and biologic properties, and then applied for a patent
on the substance.215 Many patents for genes and proteins are based on the
same type of work. An inventor determines that the body forms a
substance, a protein, for example. The inventor isolates and purifies the
substance, identifies its structure, determines a use, and then applies for a
patent on the substance.
Although such protein patents are routinely granted, the logic of the
public use and benefit rule would deny patenting under the circumstances.
After all, the production of the protein is inherent in the prior art of the
human body. People are already making, using, and receiving the benefit of
the protein in their bodies, even if no one skilled in the art knows about it.
211.
Id. at 4.
212. Id. (outlining a proposed public benefit test).
213. For example, the rule forbids patenting a metabolite formed in the process of ingesting an
earlier drug, but allows patenting a byproduct formed in the process of producing an earlier invention
where the byproduct was discarded as a waste product. Compare id. at 11-12 (describing Schering
Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), with id. at 5-6 (describing
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880)), and id. at 14 (describing Edison Electric Light Co. v.
Novelty Incandescent Lamp Co., 167 F. 977 (3d Cir. 1909)). Thus, the rule brings into harmony some
difficult cases.
214. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
215. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
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If the body's formation of the Schering metabolite leads to inherency, so
should the body's formation of the protein. From the logic of the proposed
rule, therefore, the protein, and an astounding array of other biospace
2 16
inventions, would be unpatentable.
The public use and benefit rule also suffers from the same problem as
the broader inherency rule. Although the public use and benefit rule offers
the prospect of reining in patent holders by limiting their ability to reach
backward, it has the perverse effect of increasing their ability to reach
forward.
Specifically, when examining a piece of prior art to decide whether a
later invention is anticipated, the proposed rule would hold that the piece of
art includes things inherently in use, even if no one knows about those
things. If that piece of prior art is something on which another inventor
holds a patent, 217 however, the inventor of that piece of prior art also
should be able to claim that the invention includes things inherently in use.
After all, how can we hold up a sphere and say, "When we look at it from
one direction it is an apple, and when we look at it from another direction it
is an orange"? Either the invention includes the unknown element or it does
not.
Following the logic of the proposed rule, therefore, all inventions
would reach to things inherently in use--even if those elements could not
be recognized by anyone in the field and were not described or enabled by
the inventor. This is a remarkably expansive view of the footprint of an
invention.
We could, of course, draw artificial lines. We could declare that on the
one hand, when an inventor creates something with unknown qualities and
we are trying to determine the inventor's rights, then the invention does not
reach those qualities. On the other hand, when an inventor creates
something with unknown qualities and we are trying to determine the rights
of other inventors, then the invention does reach those qualities. This
approach is offered by Burk and Lemley to rationalize the asymmetries
created by the proposed rule.2 18
216. Cf id. at 994 (objecting to the rule that prior art can anticipate even as to unknown elements,
and asking if the panel intends that no newly discovered product found in an organism can be patented).
217. Prior art can be something unpatented, such as a substance found in nature, but prior art is
often something on which other inventors hold a patent.
218. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 210, at 27 (noting that the "result, while seemingly odd in its
asymmetry, makes sense as a policy matter").
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Along the same lines, we could determine that terms like
"enablement" have slightly different meanings in different circumstances.
This approach also is suggested by Burke and Lemley to wrestle with some
2 19
of the additional conflicts in the doctrines.
If we create different definitions that are to be applied when looking
from different directions, however, these definitions are likely to wrap
around and collide with each other. In fact, that is precisely what is
happening now in the Federal Circuit as doctrines established in isolation
expand and collide. Such collisions are bound to occur because
conceptually, we are asking the same question: does the footprint of
something that exists reach to things unknown?
Patent law can, and must, develop a consistent image of the footprint
of an invention. Without that, we cannot hope to produce a coherent body
of law that can be understood by inventors, judges, and juries alike. If we
simply add greater twists and turns of complexity without resolving the
conceptual question, we will do no more than exacerbate the current chaos
in the doctrines.
IV. DEFINING THE FOOTPRINT
As described above, the Federal Circuit starts out on the path to chaos
with cases like Hoechst and Hogan that allow patent holders to reach
broadly into the unknown. Hoechst does this through general
pronouncements of the reach of an invention as well as through specific
applications of the enablement and written description rules. 220 Hogan does
22 1
this simply through application of the enablement rule.
In later opinions, judges bob and weave, trying to avoid the
implications of doctrines that lead to puzzling and uncomfortable results.
Schering adopts a highly strained reading of the claims. 222 Plant Genetic
Systems crafts a strange line in which a patent holder can reach some, but
not all, things unknown. 22 3 The Chiron court echoes Plant Genetic Systems,
219. See id. at 17 (interpreting enablement cases to conclude that the standard for enablement is
somewhat different in different circumstances).
220. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
221. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
222. See supra Part I.A.2.
223. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding that a patent holder can reach things that could not have been contemplated in the art at the
time of the invention, but not things desired but difficult to obtain).
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but then uses another doctrine to completely eliminate a patent holder's
224
ability to reach anything unknown.
Similar patterns emerge in the inherency cases concerning whether
new inventions should be blocked by interpreting prior art to include things
unknown. 225 Some cases hold that prior art includes things unknown.
Others disagree. Finally, the Elan court tries to avoid the conflict by
226
throwing prior art questions into the enablement doctrine.
The better path is to acknowledge that cases like Hoechst and Hogan
are grounded in theories that are incompatible with the uncertain arts.
Given how little we know about each biospace invention, granting rights to
all embodiments, and everything contained therein, projects an enormous
shadow across the future, one whose size cannot even be contemplated at
the time of the invention.
For uncertain arts such as biotechnology, we should discard the notion
that the basic definition of an invention includes things that could not have
been known at the time of the invention. Rather, an invention should be
defined in light of the art at the time.
Framing the inquiry in this way not only makes sense theoretically, it
also enhances doctrinal coherence. After all, much of the current disarray
has developed as courts strain against the sweeping implications of
allowing biospace inventions to reach into unknown territory. Establishing
that the basic definition of an invention arises in light of the art at the time
of the invention can resolve the overt doctrinal conflicts as well as the more
subtle inconsistencies.
This theoretical perspective would play out across the doctrines in the
following manner: In claim construction, claims would be interpreted in
light of the art at the time of the invention, and there would be no need for
the type of strained interpretation applied in Schering. Under the
enablement and written description doctrines, a patent holder could not
reach embodiments unknown at the time of the patent. This would
eliminate the strange enablement rules in which a patent holder can reach
to some but not all things unknown, rules that are then completely undone
by certain versions of the written description doctrine. Finally, in the
doctrine of inherency, a prior art reference could not anticipate if the
224.
See supra notes 107-34 and accompanying text (describing the court's holding in Chiron and
noting its failure to follow Hoechst).

225. See supra Part ILI.B.
226. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research (Elan Pharms.111), 346 F.3d
1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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element could not have been recognized by those skilled in the art at the
time of the invention. In short, defining inventions in light of the state of
the art at the time would resolve the surface inconsistencies, as well as the
conflicting undercurrents described above.
This approach would not necessarily confine an inventor's rights
precisely to what was done by the inventor. I am suggesting that patents
should be interpreted in light of the art at the time, not that patents should
be limited to the precise words and paths of the inventor.2 27 Thus, an
inventor potentially could reach beyond the precise work completed to
what could be accomplished given what scientists knew at the time of the
invention. An inventor, however, could not reach to things that could not
have been accomplished or were unknown in the art at the time.
A. SHOULD THE RULES BE THE SAME FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS?

An inventor's rights are delineated not only by the footprint of the
invention, but also by the doctrine of equivalents. With the doctrine of
equivalents, a patent holder can argue that although the accused product is
not what the patent holder created, it should, nonetheless, be considered
equivalent.2 28 Although the current chaos involves doctrines related to
defining an invention and determining whether an accused product directly
infringes that invention, similar issues could arise under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents provides some breathing space to protect
against those who make trivial changes that the patent holder could not
have anticipated. 2 9 It is a safety net, that as one scholar has noted, "holds
out the possibility that, in rare but appropriate circumstances, courts may in
essence redraw claim boundaries using information that was not available
at the time of [the] patent prosecution." 230 In particular, the courts stress
that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied by asking whether each
227. See Feldman, supra note 138, at 48 (arguing that disclosure may include things not directly
expressed but known in the art at the time).
228. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950); Anthony H.
Azure, Festo's Effect on After-arising Technology and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV.

1153, 1157-59 (2001).
229. See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; Arriola, supra note 39, at 919-20.
230. See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151,
178 (2004).
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element of the accused product is the same or equivalent to each element of
the patented product, not by looking at the products overall.23 1
In this context, the Supreme Court has hinted that it might be receptive
to considering unknown embodiments in a doctrine of equivalents inquiry.
The suggestion appeared in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Koyogo

Kabushiki Co. in 2002.232 Festo concerned a limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents that prevents patent holders from reclaiming through
233
equivalence what they gave up at the PTO in order to obtain a patent.
The limitation, known as prosecution history estoppel, holds generally that
a patentee's decision to narrow claims through amendments at the PTO is
presumed to be a general disclaimer of territory. 234 That territory cannot be
235
reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents.
In Festo, the Supreme Court listed exceptions in which an amendment
cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. 236 The
list of exceptions included circumstances in which the applicant could not
237
have foreseen the development of the equivalent.
One could argue that the Supreme Court decision in Festo should best
be understood in the limited context of knowing relinquishment. The
message of Festo may be that a patent holder cannot be held responsible for
knowing relinquishment of something that the inventor could not have
known about. Nevertheless, it could also be read as signaling the Court's
willingness to allow consideration of unknown embodiments in the limited
context of a doctrine of equivalents analysis. Thus, Festo at least raises the
question of whether an inventor should be able to reach beyond the state of
the art for the purposes of applying the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents, however, is far too amorphous and
uncertain to provide the necessary logic and clarity on this issue. Courts
have failed to reach agreement on the verbal formulation of the test, let
alone on how the test should be applied in various settings. For example,
the test is described in some Federal Circuit cases as whether each element
231.
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997)
(explaining that the defining principles of any doctrine of equivalents formulation would include a
focus on individual elements and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to
eliminate completely any such elements).
232.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
233.
See id. at 727.
234.
See id. at 723.
235.
See id. at 740-41.

236.
237.

Id. at 740.
Id.
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of the accused device serves the same function, in the same way, to obtain
the same result as the patented device.23 8 Other Federal Circuit cases
describe the test as whether the differences between the two inventions are
insubstantial. 239 The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the debate,
holding instead that different linguistic formulations may be suitable for
different cases depending on the facts and leaving it to the Federal Circuit
to refine the test in its sound judgment. 240 The Federal Circuit has yet to
meet the challenge, and it remains one of the most uncertain areas of patent
law.
Any logic, clarity, and consistency created by limiting an invention to
the state of the art at the time of the invention could be completely
unraveled by revisiting the issue in the uncertain and undisciplined realm of
the doctrine of equivalents. 24 1 In its current form, therefore, the doctrine of
equivalents could recreate chaos throughout this area of patent law if it is
applied in more than rare circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Basic doctrines, carried over by analogy to mechanical inventions,
would define an invention broadly to include embodiments and aspects of
the invention that were unknown at the time of the invention. In fields of
great uncertainty, however, we cannot define an invention to include the
unknown without granting an extraordinarily expansive reach to inventors,
far beyond what the inventor may have contributed. The temptation to
restrain that reach has lead to strange doctrinal twists and an unworkable
body of law.
In particular, across five disparate doctrines, current cases related to
the footprint of a biospace invention pull in different theoretical directions
and stand in contradiction to each other. Judges are unable to resolve the
dilemmas because the basic theory underlining this doctrinal area is
unsound.
To resolve these problems, we must establish a clear and consistent
vision of the definition of an invention, one that can be understood by both
See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir.
banc), rev'd and remanded, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). See also 5A
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 31, § 18.0215] (2003).
241.
Cf Arriola, supra note 39, at 920 (noting commentators' concerns that the uncertainty of the
doctrine of equivalents creates disincentives to invest in innovation).
238.
239.
1995) (en
240.
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the governing and the governed. Defining an invention in light of the art at
the time of the invention brings coherence to this area of law and eliminates
the need for the contorted doctrines that have developed in the field. Thus,
for inventions in uncertain fields such as biospace, an invention should be
defined in light of the art at the time of the invention.
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